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From: Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, No. 60, 1998.

Boris Kagarlitsky

One Hundred Years of Reformism
(A review of Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism)

At the end of 1996, the new leader of Britain's Labour Party, Tony Blair (in May 1997 he became prime minister after victory in the general election), having defeated the left opposition within his own party, became the country's most fashionable political figure. At the same time, Donald Sassoon's book, One Hundred Years of Socialism,(1)  appeared on the shelves of London's book shops. The aim of this substantial work, with its wide-ranging commentaries and tables, is to provide a historical survey of the development of the West European Left from its Marxist origins to Blairite pragmatism. The author displays little interest, however, in Communist parties and has written basically a history of social democracy. Only the Italian Communists are honoured with a separate chapter but even this exception confirms the rule: it is precisely the Italian Communist Party which has transformed itself in the 1990s into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and become one of the strongest and most moderate social-democratic organisations in Europe.
In Sassoon's opinion, European socialism has been in a profound crisis and unable to achieve its original goal: the creation of a new society qualitatively different from bourgeois society. Moreover, in Sassoon's opinion, such a society is not desired by 'anyone, anywhere'. But, nevertheless, socialist organisations 'modified the trajectory of European society' (2). It is thanks to socialists that the institutions of the welfare state have arisen and the lives of working people improved.
Almost simultaneously with Sassoon's book, there appeared the work by the British historian Willie Thompson, The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics.(3)  This book is permeated with even greater pessimism. Describing the history of the main left-wing currents, the author comes to the conclusion that they will all have suffered defeat by the end of the century. During the greater part of the century the Left constantly defined the political agenda, and the Right 'seemed to be permanently on the defensive'.(4)  At the end of the century, however, traditional notions of progress, and with them left-wing ideology, have collapsed. Capitalism cannot cope with contemporary problems but the traditional left-wing project is also dead. Postmodernism and other new currents do not appear to be a real alternative for, in rejecting 'universalism' and proposing in its place a programme for the liberation of separate groups, they cannot provide an intelligible perspective for society as a whole. It only remains to hope for some sort of 'new project'.(5)
Sassoon is not so pessimistic. From its very beginning the movement has simultaneously pursued two goals: on the one hand, it has attempted to improve the position of working people under capitalism, and on the other, to liquidate capitalism itself. These goals were not initially in contradiction with one another, but as ever greater success was achieved on the path of reform, the more socialism linked its future to that of capitalism. In Sassoon's opinion, socialism's problem has always consisted in the fact that its successes have only been possible on the basis of and thanks to the successes of capitalism. And this also applies the other way round: wherever capitalism has been a failure, socialism has found itself in crisis.
This thesis seems highly convincing: it was not by accident that the rise of radicalism in Western countries after the Second World War led not to the crisis-ridden seventies, but to the prosperous sixties. The author seems unaware, however, that this very thesis undermines his own assertion concerning the outcome of preceding reforms. Recurring capitalist crises are evidence of the fact that reforms have been unable to 'remove' the fundamental contradictions engendering the socialist opposition to capitalism. Future prospects are, however, of little concern to Sassoon, for whom the history of socialism is complete. Consciously or unconsciously, he follows the layout of  Leszek Kolakowski's  Fundamental Currents in Marxism. Dividing his investigation into three volumes (origins, 'golden age', decline), the Polish author finally came to the conclusion that the sooner his own investigation was complete, the sooner Marxism itself would come to an end. Sassoon does not draw such categorical conclusions but they somehow flow from the structure of his book. The history is divided into three parts: 'expansion', 'consolidation' and 'crisis', creating a kind of Hegelian completeness. West European socialism represents a distinctive 'thing in itself'. The Russian revolution and events in the USSR are referred to only as background, and their influence on Western socialism is reduced to the split with social-democracy which gave rise to the Comintern (the political and ideological significance of which is limited to a discussion of the 21 conditions of membership proposed by Lenin). Paradoxically, Lenin is quoted on a number of occasions when the author refers to his ideas for confirmation of his own opinions. The Third World exists throughout as an external background, undeserving of attention. Formally the author is correct to do this insofar as this is not what the book is about. Moreover, he emphasises that he is concerned exclusively with the history of parties, and is not interested in the history of the left-wing movement and socialist ideas. But in so doing, the history of parties is reduced in the final analysis to the history of the political apparatus of social democracy.
It must be said that the author does not idealise socialists. He recounts in detail the most unsavoury episodes in the history of social democracy, in particular the social democrats' collaboration with the Nazis in Denmark during the occupation and in Finland during the war against the USSR, and also the transition to collaborationist positions of several of the leading members of  the socialist parties of Belgium, Holland and France.
The golden age of social democracy arrived in the post-war years simultaneously with the rise of regulated capitalism. This period came to an end with the oil crisis of 1973. The achievements of the 'golden age' were considerable. Now they must be defended.
"However, West European socialism, evolutionary "welfare" socialism, pioneered by Bernstein, developed in Britain, Germany and Sweden, based on strong unions, state intervention and a growing public sector was, by the 1980s, unmistakably in crisis. By the 1990s, it even proved difficult to defend the gains thus far achieved: the welfare state, full employment and trade union rights; the first was in danger, the second had become a thing of the past, and the third was severely curtailed." (6)
Even worse, the Left had no means of overcoming the situation.
"Socialists had run out of ideas. In the 1960s they had abandoned the idea of abolishing capitalism; in the 1970s and 1980s they proclaimed that they were the ideal managers of it. By 1989, when the Berlin Wall collapsed, the conventional reformist idea that it was necessary to possess a large public sector to countervail the negative tendencies of the private sector had evaporated from the programmes of all socialist parties. The privatisation of the public sector, previously unthinkable even among most conservatives, came to be accepted by many socialists."(7)
The social base of the movement has also changed. It is becoming ever more eroded. Representatives of the middle class are replacing organised workers, who in turn are becoming depoliticised. Wage-labourers have themselves changed: they are no longer just white, Christian males, but also young women or immigrant Muslims. The culture and traditions of labour are changing. Ecological and feminist ideas are becoming more prominent in society but, despite their attractiveness for the Left, they are not, unlike the ideology of socialism, its exclusive 'property'.
How does Sassoon propose to overcome this crisis? In the book he demonstratively declines to answer. He does, however, provide a partial answer in an article published in the Observer soon after his book appeared. This article, titled 'Reformers ... Supporters of renewal ... New realists ... New labourites ...' does not simply repeat word for word a few pages from the book, but sets itself the goal of providing an historical justification for the correctness of the policies of the new Labour leader, Tony Blair. In Sassoon's opinion, if Britain is different in many ways from continental Europe, and the British Tories are extremely provincial, then New Labour on the other hand is in step with social democracy on the continent.
Sassoon remarks that:
"Those who do not like New Labour will have to come up with a better explanation of its origins than the one currently doing the rounds, namely that the party has been hijacked by a pinko-Thatcherite Christian fundamentalist, surrounded by a clique of assorted dark forces and teenagers on the make, equipped with the historical memory of a goldfish. Throughout Europe democratic socialists and / or social democrats have abandoned what Willy Brandt called "the theology of the final goal." (8)
None of them adheres to the idea that socialism is a state of affairs following on from capitalism, or that it encompasses the expansion of state ownership.
British New Labour, Sassoon continues, is on a par with the 'renovadores' in the Spanish PSOE, and tendencies referred to as 'riformisti' in Italy and 'nouveaux realistes' in Belgium, which in the last analysis
"have built on the so-called revisionist tradition initiated by Eduard Bernstein at the end of the last century and continued in the late Fifties by Anthony Crosland and the drafters of the Bad Godesberg programme of the German SPD. Over the years, they have abandoned the idea that a single class - the traditional male factory proletariat - was somehow endowed by history with the task of embodying the hopes and aspiration of the whole of humanity. This loss - if it is a loss - has effectively delivered socialists of a utopian albatross. Capitalism is not a particular transitory phase in historical development but a mode of production. The task of socialists lies in devising a political framework which enables the advancement of certain values, such as justice and equality, while ensuring that the regulatory system imposed does not seriously impair the viability of capitalism. Thriving capitalism does not guarantee socialist successes, but capitalist failures and decay have never provided the Left with an opportunity for progress."(9)
Here Sassoon undeniably encounters a serious methodological problem which for a historian should not remain undetected. If the theoretical and ideological bases of the new revisionism were laid by Bernstein and were evidently triumphant back at the turn of the century then what is 'new' in 'new realism' and why it has become necessary seems incomprehensible. In other words, what is crucial is not new realism's continuity with Bernstein but the manner in which it breaks with or modifies the traditions of European revisionism. Sassoon declines to tackle this problem. A solution is, however, contained in his article, albeit in a concealed form.
Describing the achievements of the 'new realists', Sassoon enumerates chiefly the withdrawn slogans, the discarded promises and rejected principles. The list of victories is exclusively negative despite the fact that they had prevailed over their own past.
"New Labour has rewritten Clause Four, but other parties of the Left have preceded it; they dumped traditionalist symbols and images, discarded a utopian vision of a socialist society and reconstructed themselves. Some had much further to go: the Italian Communist Party turned itself into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), jettisoned the hammer and sickle and adopted an oak tree as its new symbol. It is now a member of the Socialist International and the backbone of Italy's new left-of-centre government, the first in the country's history.
The new PDS advocated a state which "would do less but enable more" and "would step back from directly managing economic activities and develop instead a role in regulating the market". It accepted the principle that "in the present historical circumstances there are no alternatives to the market economy"; that it was not possible to return to "traditional recipes of sustaining employment through global demand management"; and that privatisation "can provide the opportunity to restructure the national economy on a more modern foundation".
The Spanish socialists started out by dumping Marxism in the late Seventies; they proceeded to rule Spain for more than 14 years, during which they helped the private sector to modernise itself while constructing the first welfare state in their country's history. It has not been a history of unmitigated successes - unemployment is still at an intolerable level - but their achievements should not be dismissed.
In France, the socialists eventually accepted that markets should be regulated by legislation and not through state ownership. The Left, throughout Europe, now accepts that the object of socialism is not the abolition of capitalism but its coexistence with social justice, and that the trade unions are to be regarded as representing workers' interests with no presumptive claim to have a greater say in politics than other interest groups.
It means giving a far greater priority to the concerns of consumers and having the political courage to accept aspects of the liberal critique of socialism - including the association between collective provision and bureaucratic inertia."(10)
One cannot fail to notice that he is dealing in a majority of cases not with parties with a revolutionary ideology but with thoroughly reformist organisations, with a long tradition of theoretical and programmatic thinking in the spirit of revisionism. And it is precisely these which have felt the need to reject their former ideas.
Sassoon observes that
"As early as 1988, Peter Glotz, then general secretary of the German SPD, warned that "the Left must shelve its centralist megalomania and drop the obsessive conviction that the state can effectively manage the whole economy ... As part of its plans for exerting control over the market economy, the Left must stand up for consumer rights, free investment decisions, the free disposal of assets and a decentralised decision-making process."
In 1969, the Norwegian Labour Party still declared its goal to be "a socialist society". By 1981, it had replaced this aim with values such as freedom, democracy and equality. In 1989, it emphasised individualism and collective freedom and accepted that the state had become too burdensome, and the public sector had grown too large. It said that the state regulation of markets should be in the interests of consumers and not only of producers.
In 1991, the Austrian Socialist Party renamed itself the Social Democratic Party. Its new programme emphasised social-democratic economic policies drawn out of a competitive economy and using market mechanisms restrained by a network of social safeguards and the principle of solidarity."(11)
Nor did Greece remain an exception. In 1996,
"the Greek socialist government of Costas Simitis won the election on a platform repudiating the rigid labour market and the corporatist and statist mentality of the past. Simitis argued that efficiency and privatisation were not by-words which could be left to the Right; they had to be used to defend a new concept of social justice and building a welfare state for the next century.
Socialists are increasingly concerned with a fairer tax system: for example, in Germany in May 1994 the new SPD leader, Rudolf Scharping, proposed a new tax plan with tax cuts for the lower paid.
In Holland, the Labour Party - which fought (and lost) the 1986 election on an intransigent defence of the welfare state - embarked on a wide-ranging reappraisal of its ideology."
The new party leaders came to the conclusion that '"when the market actually works" it is "better able than any other mechanism to chart reliably the economic performances of companies and cater for the preferences of consumers"'. It was also agreed that
"capitalism was a condition of democracy, and that the welfare state had to be reformed in order to strike a new balance between efficiency and justice. In 1994, the Dutch Labour Party was leading the first government in modern Dutch history without the Christian Democrats.
In Finland, the leader of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, Paavo Lipponen, having lost the general election in 1991, embraced market reforms declaring that "... we need a real paradigm change... We have to get more flexibility and reduce labour costs and social security costs". Lipponen is now his country's Prime Minister..."(12)
This list should convince the reader that repudiating one's principles is the most reliable road to power. True, the left Labour reviewer of Sassoon's book, Jim Mortimer, notes that the facts provided in his own book contradict such a conclusion. If one takes a rather longer period than the last 5-7 years, it turns out that over the past 25 years the Left's biggest electoral victories have been achieved 'on the basis of radical programmes'. This applies even to the model 'realist' parties of Spain, France and Greece, which initially forced their way to power precisely with radical slogans. In 1974, when the Labour Party won the election in Britain, they also conducted a very radical campaign. 'Not one of these governments subsequently carried out its promises, but this does not alter the fact that the electorate liked their original radical programmes'.(13)
However, history does not always teach the present a lesson. Let us assume that Sassoon is correct and the electorate rejects left-wing ideas. If this is the major lesson drawn by European socialists from one hundred years of their history then the British Labourites are undoubtedly 'swimming with the current'. Consequently, everything is going well for them, the more so as moderate socialists are in power, either on their own or in coalition with other parties, in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Australia, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Luxemburg, and since the beginning of 1997 also in Britain and France. Now the Left must find a common language with other forces adhering to the idea of a 'social' Europe. These forces, in Sassoon's opinion, include continental conservatives, who speak the language of social solidarity - from Jacques Chirac's Gaullists to Helmut Kohl's Christian Democrats. True, in Germany and France themselves they view the situation differently. While Chirac's social conservatism is being discussed in Britain, his popularity in his home country is falling rapidly and his policies are considered anti-social as the results of the June 1997 elections confirmed. And even in Germany, the invincible Helmut Kohl is losing support. The reason is the same - mass social dissatisfaction. The standard of living is falling, although this is not the main reason. Rather, the quality of life is declining, as insecurity, bitterness and stress are increasing, If such a society is becoming the norm across Europe, should one be striving for it? The American journalist, Daniel Singer, has incidentally written an excellent article in 'The Nation'. In his opinion, more and more people are arguing that if what is proposed is our future, it would be better not to have any future at all.
But back to the question: where is the novelty in 'new realism'? Is it really in its capacity to find a common language with social-conservatives or enlightened liberals? But this is not quite so new. From the very first stages of its development, the modern workers' movement has been confronted with the question: is its goal the replacement of capitalism with a new, better and more just society or is it a matter of improving capitalism. None other than Karl Marx in Volume I of Capital (in the section devoted to English factory legislation) wrote of the possibility of improving capitalism through social regulation. Sassoon is convinced that today these disputes are pointless and that an answer has been found: socialism must improve capitalism.
Acceptance or non-acceptance of this thesis is a matter of taste. Let us assume for a moment that Sassoon is right and that humanity cannot in principle create anything better than capitalism, and we have only to concern ourselves with its improvement (as they earlier improved Soviet 'developed socialism'). The question is could New Labour, Tony Blair and other representatives of 'new realism', to whom Sassoon links the future of the Western Left, cope with this task.
One is immediately struck by the fact that, while discussing in general terms social capitalism and the creation of a new version of the welfare state, the author could not name a single concrete reform carried out or at least promised by the 'new realists'. But to make up for it he notes the patent convergence of the 'new realists' positions with those of left-wing and 'socially oriented' conservatives - Chirac's neo-Gaullists in France and Kohl's Christian Democrats in Germany. But if the Left cannot be distinguished from the Right, what use is the Left? The notion of an evolutionary improvement of capitalism is incompatible in principle with reformism. An evolutionary improvement of the system requires not social reformers but thoughtful conservatives, intelligently deployed by the government of the day. Reform is needed precisely when natural evolution, structural improvement and routine corrections of course prove insufficient and the accumulated contradictions threaten more serious crises. The reformist movement begins from the premise that the system is bad. It is another matter that the reformists are not inclined to raze it to the ground, but desire only to replace important elements. A harsh critique of capitalism was the starting point not just of revolutionary Marxism but also of social-democratic 'revisionism'. It was precisely for this reason that social democrats succeeded with reforms in the Forties and Fifties. The starting-point of Roosevelt's 'New Deal' in the USA was also that the system had to be changed, that society was in profound crisis and that a social explosion could only be averted through serious changes. 'New realism' in Europe, on the other hand, starts from approval and acceptance of existing society. It is not a question of whether this society in itself is good or bad (for some it's good, for others not so). The problem is that alternatives cannot be elaborated on this basis.
It must be acknowledged that Sassoon treats 'new revisionism' rather more strictly in his book than in his article. He remarks that 'To know that it is necessary to innovate, without knowing how to do it or in which direction to proceed, is not necessarily an intellectually vacuous position to hold'.(14)  Nevertheless, the demands of political 'expediency' triumph over intellectual needs. Historical research leads to the conclusion that the entire previous path was followed simply to reach the point at which we are today. The goal is nothing but the movement has ceased. The end of history ...
Meanwhile socialism can play a major role in improving capitalism precisely on the strength of its anticapitalist essence. Reform of the system requires an internal ideological impulse. Moreover, capitalism has throughout its history required stabilisation from within. Precisely because of its own dynamism, the capitalist system is subject to constant crises and shocks. It is for this reason that capitalism required at first Christian traditions, monarchy and aristocracy, then the socialist institutions of the welfare state in the West or Confucian feudal clan structures in the East. The periods of most 'pure' capitalism were the most bloody and unstable times in history.
Sassoon repeats Keynes' words to the effect that capitalism must be tamed. But if socialist ideology ceases to be a principled alternative to capitalism, if the workers' movement loses its capacity for aggressive behaviour and is incapable of decisive struggle against the bourgeoisie, then it will not be able to tame anyone or anything. Without class hatred you cannot have any social reforms or social partnership. On the whole partnership is generated not by the partners' mutual sympathies but by an understanding that a rejection of collaboration could lead to catastrophic consequences.
From Sassoon's point of view, 'new realism's biggest trump-card is the ability of people equipped with such ideas to come to power. He admits, incidentally, that this was the main aim of the ideological reforms carried out by New Labour. 'The long period in opposition had united the party round a single objective: to regain power at virtually any cost', remarks the historian in the conclusion to his book.(15)
The aim of course is worthy, but what next? Describing the successes of the continental parties, along whose route the British are travelling, Sassoon has very little to say about the concrete results of government by 'realists'. This is understandable - there is nothing to write about. However surprising this may seem, Sassoon believes that coming to power is itself an achievement. For politicians dreaming about their seats, such a thought would be normal. But for an intellectual! But at last we have arrived at an answer to our main question: what is new in 'new realism'? Here is its principled philosophical and political foundation: electoral victory, the gaining of power, and obtaining ministerial positions in and of themselves constitute the meaning and only goal of political activity. Power is no longer a means but has become a goal in itself and the supreme value. There is nothing Nietzschean in this. To accuse such an approach of being totalitarian would be unjustified for the notions of power in this instance are very modest. Power does not mean the capacity to act, command and transform, as the great reformers, liberators, heroes and tyrants understood it, only a simple, peaceful term in office.
Here we have the quintessence of the functionary's world view in the circumstances of contemporary Western democracy. The art of politics involves maximising the number of ministerial portfolios and positions for one's own group. Democracy consists in the competition between a few groups for a limited number of seats.
The political successes of 'new realism' in this sphere are indisputable but it is precisely here that a problem arises. The quicker 'new realists' come to power, the quicker they lose it. Even worse, having lost it once, they probably cannot win it back again. The Spanish Socialist Party, which is undoubtedly a model both for Sassoon and for politicians like Blair, has already lost power. The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP) became the first left-wing party in Eastern Europe to come to power in order to carry out a right-wing programme, initiating the region's 'left-wing' wave. Lithuania has also initiated the return of the Right. The LDLP's catastrophic defeat at the 1996 elections is the completely logical outcome of its government.
The 'new realists' only come to power where right-wing parties are so discredited and weakened that they cannot hold on to power under any circumstances. In Spain after the decades of right-wing dictatorship, conservative politicians were so compromised that they simply could not compete with the socialists, the more so as the bourgeoisie had no objections to a 'left-wing government' implementing right-wing policies. But as soon as a change of generation had taken place and new people, unconnected to the past, became prominent on the Right, the socialists lost power. It has proved a common occurrence that socialists come to power on a wave of general irritation at neo-liberal policies and continue to implement precisely the same policies after their victory. There inevitably follows a loss of positions and authority and, eventually, defeat. Nor is it in any sense obligatory that the defeat of left-wing 'realists' will lead to the return to power of moderate right-wingers. Everywhere the coming to power of a 'realist' Left has been accompanied by the rapid rise of a radical, anti-democratic Right. The Polish dissident and one-time ideologue of Solidarity, Karel Modzelewski, gloomily predicts that, after the defeat of the moderate Left, right-wing liberals will also fail to regain their previous influence. Society will swing even further to the right. The 'reds' will be replaced by the 'blacks'.(16)  In Britain, where the Left was out of power for many years, there are virtually no neo-fascists. In contrast, the rapid rise of Le Pen in France is one of the most obvious consequences of 14 years of socialist government.
The 'realists' are interested least of all in their 'traditional' social base. They are convinced that the lower orders and the working class will support them in any case as these social strata have nowhere else to go. The policies of the 'new realists' are designed to win the support of the middle class. However, the lower orders, forgotten by everyone, are unexpectedly finding their own way out. The 'Left's obvious and open betrayal of their interests is forcing them to turn to the far Right, which not only demagogically exploits their difficulties, but unlike the 'realist' Left, promotes demands in practice which meet the concrete interests of a significant part of the population. These just demands are mixed up with nationalist and racist lies about immigrants and foreigners as the source of all ills. But if we do not understand that, for example, anti-Europeanism and the hostility of the 'new Right' to European integration correspond completely to the feelings and needs of millions of people, we will fail to grasp the causes of the rapid success of politicians like Le Pen. The Left says that everything is alright. The Right denies this, and the average person knows full well who is lying. The Left says that there is no other path than tightening one's belt and joining a united Europe but the average citizen of France, Britain or even Germany frequently has no desire to go in that direction, let alone tighten their belt. At the end of 1996 the 'European' newspaper published sensational opinion poll data indicating that if a referendum were held in Britain on the question of relations with Europe, supporters of integration would lose.(17)  In this sense it is precisely the right wing of the Tories which expresses to the greatest degree the mood of the average voter. I think that the coming to power of the Left will lead to the Conservatives shifting even further to the right, and by doing so they will gain broad popular support.
The Left prefers not to discuss bureaucracy. The far Right talks about it. The Left argues that international institutions are working in everyone's interests. The far Right denies this. The masses listen and quickly realise that in the Left's propaganda there is at least no less demagogy than in the Right's.
'New realism' long ago became programmatic for German social democracy but its ability to come to power has proved minimal. Wherever bourgeois parties are effective there is no demand for 'new realists'. But Germany is also interesting for another reason. In the eastern Länder, where the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) is active and repudiates the ideas of the 'new realists', the right-wing radical party, the Republicans, has achieved no notable success. In the western Länder, where there are no serious forces to the left of social democracy, protest votes are going to the neo-fascists.
Such is the reality of contemporary Europe that neo-fascism is ripening in the shadow of 'new realism' and seeking to take its place. The Left's incapacity and crisis engender on the one hand a distinct type of politician who tries to turn precisely the impotence, weakness and demoralisation of their own party into an advantage in the struggle for personal power. On the other hand, such 'realism' indicates an incapacity to implement reforms where they have become essential. It is here that it is dangerous, for it is fraught with new crises.
'New realism' is the perfectly natural offspring of the crisis of socialism. But it is a symptom of illness and not its cure. If the contradictions of the system are not quickly overcome, and the discontent of the population becomes more openly displayed, it will prove most likely only the prelude to a 'new radicalism'. It is merely a question of whether this radicalism will be of a left-wing variety. To a significant degree this depends on left-wing politicians, trade union figures, leaders and activists of the workers' movement themselves.


1. D. Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, London, Fontana.
2. Ibid, p.xxi
3. W. Thompson, The Left in History: Revolution and Reform in Twentieth-Century Politics, London, Pluto.
4. Ibid, p.9
5. Ibid, p.231
6. Sassoon p.648
7. Sassoon p.649
8. D. Sassoon, 'Why the Left lost Utopia', The Observer November 24, 1996, p.28
10. Ibid
11. Ibid
12. Ibid
13. Socialist Campaign Group News January 1997, p.10
14. Sassoon p.735
15. Sassoon p.739
16. See K. Modzelewski, Wohin von Kommunismus aus? Berlin 1996, pp.179, 188
17. The European 9 December 1996